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ABSTRACT
This paper presents TapMeIn, an eyes-free, two-factor authentica-
tion method for smartwatches. It allows users to tap a memorable
melody (tap-password) of their choice anywhere on the touchscreen
to unlock their watch. A user is verified based on the tap-password
as well as her physiological and behavioral characteristics when
tapping. Results from preliminary experiments with 41 participants
show that TapMeIn could achieve an accuracy of 98.7% with a False
Positive Rate of only 0.98%. In addition, TapMeIn retains its perfor-
mance in different conditions such as sitting and walking. In terms
of speed, TapMeIn has an average authentication time of 2 seconds.
A user study with the System Usability Scale (SUS) tool suggests
that TapMeIn has a high usability score.
Keywords
Tap-based Authentication; Rhythm-based Authentication; Smart-
watch; Shoulder Surfing; Usable Security; Biometrics
1. INTRODUCTION
Smartwatches are becoming increasingly popular thanks to the seam-
less experience they offer to consumers [12], with their applications
ranging from getting notifications, tracking health and fitness, to
conducting financial transactions [17, 29]. Recently, smartwatches
are being used to conveniently unlock computers [18, 14] and even
cars [38, 39]. However, despite potentially containing sensitive
and private information, smartwatches are not as secure as their
counterparts–mobile phones as shown in [16, 23]. Specifically,
researchers have found that only five out of the ten most popular
smartwatch models offer a lock screen method (either a PIN or a
Pattern Lock), to protect user information in a stolen device scenario.
Further, two in ten devices can be paired with an attacker’s smart-
phone without any difficulty [16]. Moreover, protection methods are
often turned off by default and smartwatches usually do not prompt
users to enable them (except Apple Watch) [23].
Even the PIN and Pattern Lock methods, if at all used, have many
weaknesses. They are known to be vulnerable to guessing attacks [7,
31], shoulder surfing [40, 35, 27], smudge attack [4], and video
attack where a whole authentication session could be recorded with
a camera or a device like Google Glass or GoPro [42]. From a
usability point of view, authentication with a PIN or a Pattern may
suffer from the “fat-finger problem” due to the limited size of the
smartwatch screen [34]. Moreover, putting biometric sensors like fin-
gerprint scanners and camera for face recognition on smartwatches
may be difficult given their small form factors.
This paper introduces TapMeIn, an eyes-free, two-factor authen-
tication method that allows a user to tap a memorable melody or
∗Published at [25]
tap-password on the smartwatch touchscreen to login. A user is ver-
ified based on the correctness of the tap-password as well as features
which depend on the physiological and behavioral characteristics of
a user.
TapMeIn offers several desirable features. First, in terms of security,
its two-factor nature makes guessing, smudge and shoulder surfing
attacks less relevant. Even in the case where an attacker knows and
can repeat the melody of a user, he still needs to pass behavioral and
physiological verification which is significantly more difficult. This
protection also applies to video attacks as shown in our evaluation.
Second, in terms of usability, its eyes-free feature, allows the user
to tap anywhere on the screen, and hence not only solves the fat-
finger problem but also enables users to login discreetly and benefits
users with visual impairment. In different conditions like sitting and
walking, TapMeIn achieves performance similar to that of PIN and
Pattern Lock methods.
It is envisioned that TapMeIn can be deployed as lock/unlock method
or to secure pairing between a watch and a phone. It can also be
displayed as an option along the PIN or Pattern for the user to choose
based on the context of usage or surroundings. For example, users
can choose TapMeIn to unlock their watch in a public place where
the risk of being observed by someone is high. And when they are
at home or alone, they can unlock their watch with Pattern Lock or
the regular PIN method.
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows.
• We propose TapMeIn, an eyes-free, two-factor authentica-
tion for smartwatches with a touchscreen which provides
resilience against guessing, smudge, shoulder surfing and, to
some degree, video attacks.
• We introduce and evaluate a new feature set for tap-based
authentication.
• We present comprehensive evaluation results of TapMeIn
through a study involving 41 participants, in different contexts
(sitting and walking) and in several attack scenarios.
• We present a comparative study of several authentication
methods on smartwatches, including TapMeIn and de-facto
PIN and Pattern Lock authentication. The results show that
while there is no significant difference in error rate between
TapMeIn and the other two methods, TapMeIn provides a
much higher resilience against shoulder surfing and video
attacks. In terms of login speed, TapMeIn is slightly slower
than Pattern Lock but there is no significant difference with
4-digit PIN authentication. PIN and Pattern Lock have been
evaluated extensively on smartphones, however, study of their
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performance on smartwatches is sparse. We provide interest-
ing insights as a baseline for future research on this topic.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: The threat model and
design of TapMeIn as well as its modules are presented in Section 2.
Data collection and the performance evaluation results (the first
study) are detailed in Section 3 and Section 4, respectively. The
second study, detailed in Section 5, presents a comparison between
TapMeIn and the two methods currently available on smartwatches:
PIN and Pattern Lock. Discussion and limitations are described
in Section 6. Related work is presented in Section 7. Section 8
concludes this paper.
2. TAPMEIN SYSTEM DESIGN
In this section, we first present the threat model and give an overview
of TapMeIn. Then details of its modules are described in subsequent
subsections.
2.1 Threat Model
We designed TapMeIn with a focus on shoulder surfing and video
attack threat models. In the shoulder surfing scenario, an attacker
obtains a user’s tap-password by observing a user unlocking her
watch using TapMeIn from reasonably close proximity. The obser-
vation can be made once or multiple times. In the video attack, a
determined attacker goes to a great length to impersonate a user
by video-recording an authentication session of the user. He then
learns the user’s tap-password by watching the video carefully and
practicing its performance then tries to imitate the user. In the next
few sections, we present detailed design of TapMeIn and a study to
evaluate TapMeIn performance under these threat models.
2.2 System overview
Like any other biometric system, TapMeIn consists of two phases:
Enrollment and Verification as depicted in Figure 1.
• Enrollment: In the enrollment phase, a user is asked to
choose a melody as her tap-password and requested to pro-
vide samples of her tap-password. Each enrollment sample
is first checked for its length (number of taps). If the length
is not correct, the user is prompted to reenter it. The sample
is then passed to a Data Processing module for extraction of
data used in later steps. At this phase, there are no negative
samples for the training of the classifier. We choose an ap-
proach to generate synthesized negative samples as detailed
in a subsection below. After this step, all samples (enrollment
and synthesized negatives) are sent to a Feature Extraction
module where feature vectors are extracted as inputs to a
Classifier Training module. The Classifier Training module
trains and outputs a model of a binary classifier for the user.
• Verification: In the verification phase, anyone attempting to
unlock the watch needs to enter a tap-password. TapMeIn
first verifies that the entered tap-password has the correct
length. If not, access to the watch will be rejected immediately.
Otherwise, the input tap-password also goes through Data
Processing and Feature Extraction modules. The resulting
feature vector is fed into a Verification module, where the user
classifier’s model is applied to determine whether the entered
tap-password is legitimate and access should be granted or
not.
Details of TapMeIn’s modules are presented in following subsec-
tions.
2.3 User Input
A tap is defined by two events: TOUCH_DOWN is the event when
the finger touches the screen and TOUCH_UP is the event when
it is lifted off. In modern touchscreen devices like smartwatches,
when a user taps on the screen, multiple sensor data can be acquired
from that event. Among these data, TapMeIn uses pressure, size of
touch and timestamp values.
Let T = {Ti}l1 represent a tap-password of length l in which each
tap is:
Ti = {TOUCH_DOWNi,down_tsi, pi,si,TOUCH_UPi,up_tsi}where:
• pi: pressure, indicating how hard the finger pressed on the
screen, pi ∈ [0..1]. Pressure values are often different among
different users, because each user has a different tapping
behavior.
• si: size of touch, indicating how much skin of the finger
touched the screen, si ∈ [0..1]. Size value depends on both
user’s physiological and behavioral characteristics. For exam-
ple, users with bigger fingers might be likely to touch harder
on the screen, which results in higher pressure and size values.
• down_tsi and up_tsi: the timestamps when the finger touch
down and are lifted off the screen
2.4 Data Processing
This module prepares data for feature extraction. A melody is
comprised of rhythms where each rhythm can be represented by a
down and an up duration of each tap. The down duration indicates
how long the finger touches on the screen in a tap and the up duration
indicates the time between two consecutive taps. The sequence of
up and down duration makes up the melody. Even if two users
choose the same melody, their interpretations of the melody will be
different and that difference will be reflected in their up and down
duration sequences. The duration sequence is extracted as follows.
For each tap Ti, let ∆di , ∆
u
i be its down and up duration respectively.
Then:
∆di = up_tsi−down_tsi; ∆ui = down_tsi+1−up_tsi (1)
Note that the last tap does not have the up duration ∆lu. The times-
tamps data are removed, and the tap-password at the end of this
process is as follows:
T = {T¯i}l1 where T¯i = {pi,si,∆di ,∆ui }. In other words, T consists of
four timeseries of pressure, size of touch, down and up duration.
After pre-processing, the tap-password is sent to the Feature Extrac-
tion module.
2.5 Feature Extraction
This module takes processed tap-password T = {T¯i}N1 from the Data
Processing module and extracts a vector containing features used
in TapMeIn. We extract both time-domain and frequency-domain
features.
Time-domain features. First, all values in the four timeseries are
added to the feature vector. Then, we extract statistical features from
each timeseries including min, max, mean and variance.
Frequency-domain features. We transform each timeseries into its
frequency representation using Fast Fourier Transform (FFT). We
2
Figure 1: TapMeIn system overview
then calculate magnitudes of FFT components. Statistical measures
of these magnitudes are added to the feature vector including min,
max, mean and variance values. Finally, energy, computed as sum
of all magnitudes of each timeseries, is added to the feature vector.
The output feature vector is then passed to a Classifier Training
module in the enrollment phase or to a Verification module in the
verification phase.
2.6 Negative Samples Generation
Two challenges that have to be addressed to devise a good classifier
model for TapMeIn are the lack of negative or imitation samples
and a small sample set for classifier training. This is because, first,
we usually do not have impostor’s samples in the enrollment phase
and, second, requiring a user to provide many samples for training
is not reasonable and may harm the usability of the system. As these
are common problems, several approaches have been applied in the
literature to address them.
The first approach is to use a distance-based classifier which de-
termines the legitimacy of an entered password by comparing its
distance to enrollment samples with a predetermined threshold [41,
21, 22, 36, 28, 37]. The distance function can be Hamming [22],
Euclidean [21], or Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) [36, 28, 37].
However, this approach usually does not give the desired perfor-
mance for tap-based authentication: either a low accuracy (i.e.,
83.2% as reported in [41]) or a high false positive rate (i.e., 5 false
positives out of every 30 impostor’s trials = 16.67% as reported
in [22]).
The second approach is to use a one-class classifier, which is trained
on a data set containing only one type of samples, i.e., legitimate
samples, but can be used to classify both legitimate and illegitimate
samples at verification phase [32]. This approach, unfortunately,
also requires a significant number of enrollment samples for training.
A third approach is to preload negative samples onto the device or
download them from a server at the time of classifier training [10].
This proposal has a significant drawback, which is, besides the fact
that we do not know in advance what kind of tap-password or melody
a user will choose, totally random negative samples usually bias
the classifier. For example, the classifier performs well on training
because randomly generated negatives are usually distinguishable
from legitimate samples, but performs poorly for verification when
real imitation samples from the impostors are used, i.e., samples
from a shoulder surfing attack. We have observed this problem in
our experiments.
Finally, another plausible approach is to generate synthesized nega-
tive samples, which can help to address both challenges: producing
negative samples as well as increasing the training set size. We
adopt this approach for TapMeIn. We tried different ways of gener-
ating negative samples and observed TapMeIn performance in each
case. We found that generating completely random samples does not
work as the classifier can easily separate two classes in the training
set, but fails to classify real impostor samples. Our approach for
generating negative samples is as follows. First, we collect many
tap-passwords from diverse subjects to build distributions of each
feature in tap-passwords. Specifically, we will have a distribution
for pressure, a distribution for size of touch, a distribution for down
duration and a distribution for up duration. We only need to ship
representations of these distributions (min, max, mean, standard
deviation) with TapMeIn, which are negligible in size. To generate a
negative sample for a user, we draw from each distribution a random
value for each tap feature (pressure, size, down and up duration).
This process stops when the number of taps equals to the length of
user’s tap-password. The procedure can be repeated many times
to generate a desired number of samples. The set consisting of the
user’s enrollment and synthesized samples is then passed to Feature
Extraction and eventually to the Classifier Training module to build
a model for the user’s tap-password.
2.7 Classifier Training
This module trains a binary classifier for each user using the feature
vectors extracted from the training set of the user. We choose
Support Vector Machines (SVM) [11] and Random Forests [8] as
our classifiers. In a binary classification problem like ours, SVM
builds a hyperplane to separate feature space such that it maximizes
the margin between the two classes. Random Forests is an ensemble
learning method that constructs a forest, which is a combination of
many decision trees, at training time. The forest is used to classify
an input vector by inputting the vector to every tree in the forest.
Each tree outputs a classification and the forest chooses the class
with the most “votes" among the trees as the final prediction. To tune
parameters for each classifier, we run a grid search with different
parameter sets on the training data and pick the set that returns the
best performance, i.e., accuracy.
2.8 Verification
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At verification time, a candidate user input, after passing the length
test, goes through the same Data Processing and Feature Extraction
modules. A feature vector is extracted and fed into the Verification
module, which tests it using the classifier model of the user and
determines whether this input is legitimate or not.
3. DATA COLLECTION
A study was conducted to evaluate the performance of TapMeIn in
terms of security and usability. Because smart watches are often
used on the move, i.e., walking or running, the study was designed to
explore the performance of TapMeIn in different conditions. Specifi-
cally, when users are sitting and walking. We implemented TapMeIn
on a Samsung Gear Live Smartwatch running Android Wear OS. In
the rest of this section, the study design and data collection proce-
dure are presented. Note that all studies presented in this paper were
approved by the institutional review board at our university.
3.1 Study Design
The study was conducted using a repeated measures design. The
independent variable was Condition which has two levels: Sitting
and Walking. The dependent variables were performance figures
(accuracy, error rate and authentication time). Resilience against
shoulder surfing and video attack were also evaluated.
3.2 Participants
41 participants (females=13) with an average age of 27.5 (range:
18 to 57) were recruited through email and Facebook postings. All
participants had university education and were smartphone users
and eight had experience with smartwatches before this study. 31
participants participated as users and 10 as attackers in our experi-
ments.
3.3 Procedure
All participants performed the authentication task on the same smart-
watch and the same ambient conditions. Upon their arrival to the lab,
each user was introduced to the study and was given the opportunity
to operate the smartwatch to get used to it. She was instructed to
wear the watch on the hand she usually wears one. She was then
introduced to TapMeIn and was asked to choose a melody as her
tap-password. She would start entering her tap-password after press-
ing a login button. Once she finished tapping, she pressed an enter
button at the bottom right corner of the screen. The device processed
her tap-password, returned a login result and displayed a new screen
for another login session. She was allowed to practice with TapMeIn
until she felt comfortable with it and was able to successfully log in
using this method at least five times for each condition, sitting and
walking. Data in this phase was not collected.
The authentication phase started with an enrollment of the user. She
was asked to tap her melody three times when sitting for training.
The melody was the same as in the practice phase to minimize
learning effect. She was then asked to login ten times while sitting
and ten more times while walking around the room. For counter-
balancing, half the users were randomly chosen to perform login
while sitting first and the other half was required to perform login
while walking first. Once the authentication phase was completed,
the users answered a survey on their perception of the security and
usability of TapMeIn. Overall, the study lasted about an hour for
each user.
3.4 Data Collection for Shoulder Surfing and
Video Attacks
To simulate shoulder surfing and video attacks, we video-recorded
authentication sessions of each user. An experiment conducter play-
ing the role of an attacker stood behind each user’s shoulder, on the
side where the user’s hand did not obscure the watch screen. This at-
tacker recorded, using a smartphone, several authentication sessions
of the user as she was seated. For security analysis, the set of videos
recorded were cut down to one successful authentication for each
user. The tap-password input process was clearly observed in each
video with no obstruction of user’s hand or shoulder. This setup
favored the attackers. However, we wanted to evaluate TapMeIn in
such situations.
10 participants, who were not users, were asked to simulate impos-
tors/attackers. They went through the same introduction phase as
users to get comfortable with TapMeIn and the purpose of this study.
The attackers were placed in our lab with the same smartwatch and a
computer with 21-inch monitor. All videos were played with sound
and were recorded in 1080p using a Nexus 4 phone. Each attacker
imitated all 31 users in three attacks as follows. The entire study
took about three hours for each attacker, so the attacker was required
to take several breaks during the process.
• Attack-I: One-time shoulder surfing: The attacker watched
a user’s video once and was allowed three trials to unlock the
watch using the tap-password that he collected.
• Attack-II: Two times shoulder surfing: The attacker watched
the user’s video one more time and was allowed three more
trials to unlock the watch.
• Attack-III: Video Attack: Finally, the attacker was allowed
to watch, rewind and replay the user’s video as long as he
wanted and was allowed three more trials to unlock the watch.
4. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION RESULTS
In this section, we report performance evaluation results of Tap-
MeIn based on the collected data set. We use False Positive Rate
(FPR), False Negative Rate (FNR) and Equal Error Rate (EER) to
report performance in different experiments. FPR shows how often
a system falsely accepts attackers, and FRR indicates how often
it wrongly rejects legitimate users. EER is a common metric in
biometric systems. EER is the point where FPR and FNR are equal.
Thus, EER balances between usability and security.
In terms of login speed, authentication time was used for measure-
ment. However, the time it takes to authenticate an input is small,
thus, authentication time mostly indicates input time.
There were 31 users, each providing 13 samples while sitting (3
enrollments + 10 logins) and 10 samples while walking, resulting
in a data set of 31 × 13 = 403 legitimate samples in the sitting
condition and 31 × 10 = 310 legitimate samples in the walking
condition. There were three attacks, which each had 10 attackers and
each attacker provided 3 imitation samples for each user, resulted
in a set of 31 (users) × 10 (attackers) × 3 (samples) = 930 samples
for each attack. Thus, our analysis was based on the total of 713
legitimate and 2790 imitation samples.
Evaluation was performed for each user as follows. Recall that
each user needed to provide a small number of samples in the
enrollment phase for classifier training, which was denoted as n.
For each user, we randomly chose her n samples to add to her
TrainingSet. We then generated 5n negative samples and added
them to TrainingSet. We found that classification performance
remained stable when the number of generated negatives reached 5n
and beyond, so 5n samples were enough. The classifier of each user
was trained with her TrainingSet. The remaining samples of the
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Figure 2: EERs of SVM and RF and the effect of enrollment set size
Figure 3: Top 20 features ranked by importance scores.
user in a test condition (sitting, walking, or both, depends on each
test we run) and samples from attackers were used for testing. To
avoid any bias such as randomness in negative samples, we did this
evaluation 30 times for each user, and the results were the averaged
over these 30 times. The system performance was then averaged
over all users.
All evaluations were implemented using scikit-learn1, a popular
Python library for machine learning. For tuning classifiers’ parame-
ters, we ran a grid search for each classifier with different parameter
sets on the data. We selected the set that resulted in best perfor-
mances.
4.1 Performance of different classifiers and the
effect of enrollment set size
We report the impact of different classifiers and enrollment set sizes
on the classification error rate. For this evaluation, the remaining
samples of a user including all sitting and walking samples, and
samples from every other user were used for testing the classifier of
the user. The size of the training set was changed by varying n and
results are reported in Figure 2. First, we can see that SVM outper-
formed RF in all different enrollment set sizes. Second, TapMeIn
achieved stable low error rate when n >= 5. A smaller n means
shorter enrollment time. Thus, we chose n = 5 and used SVM for
subsequent evaluations.
4.2 Features ranking and selection
To understand the importance of individual feature and to find the
most influential ones, we did feature ranking and selection as follows.
We trained a Random Forest for each user and configured it to return
importance score of each feature. This task was done 30 times for
1https://scikit-learn.org
each user with n = 5 randomly chosen enrollment samples each
time. We then ranked the top 20 features for the user based on
frequency and importance score of features. Figure 3 depicted the
top 20 features among all users ranked by importance scores. Here,
‘p’ is short for pressure, ‘s’ is size of touch, ‘d’ is down duration
and ‘u’ is up duration. We can see that there are only two raw tap
values, s1 and u1, which are the size and up duration of the first
tap. The rest are statistical values of all taps in both time-domain
and frequency-domain. This suggests that most raw tap values are
not good features. Also, there is a good mix of time-domain and
frequency-domain features, which confirms the effectiveness of our
proposed features.
4.3 Performance in different conditions
In this section, we evaluate TapMeIn’s performance in different con-
ditions, specifically, sitting and walking. First, we trained a classifier
for each user using n = 5 samples randomly selected from user’s
samples set. User samples from each condition (sitting/walking)
and samples of other users were used for testing. We configured
the classifier to return classification label (positive/negative) instead
of returning probability of each class. This way, the comparison
of error rates between the two conditions is fair because the same
threshold was applied. The results are reported in Table 2. Negative
samples were the same for the two conditions, but legitimate sam-
ples were drawn from the data set of each condition. Therefore, we
can see that FPR is the same in two conditions. FRR, however, are
different between two conditions due to different numbers of false
negatives in each condition. A paired-samples t-test was conducted
to compare FRR for sitting and walking conditions. There was a
significant difference in the FRR in two conditions (t(30) = 2.434,
p< 0.0001, with CI = [0.006,0.069]). Specifically, the results show
that FRR increased when users were walking during authentication
compared to sitting. This is expected as when people are walking,
their hands are not as stable, and that may cause more errors in their
tapping behavior. Nevertheless, being rejected 5.3 and 9.1 times
out of every 100 trials when sitting and walking, respectively, could
be acceptable, especially considering the security enhancement that
TapMeIn offers to the users.
4.4 Security evaluation
The overall performance of TapMeIn against attacks in the chosen
threat model is reported in Table 3, where legitimate samples from
both sitting and walking, combined with imitation samples from
each attack were used for testing. It can be seen that TapMeIn
achieves good performance in terms of security. Specifically, the
EER is as low as 1.3% in a Random guessing attack, and only
2.3% in Attack-I (one-time shoulder surfing). It increases to 3.5%
in Attack-II when the attackers had another observation of user’s
authentication session. In the video attack scenario (Attack-III),
despite gaining significant knowledge about user’s tap-password by
watching user’s video carefully over and over again, the attackers
achieve only 4.1% success rate. These results show that TapMeIn is
potentially resilient against shoulder surfing and video attacks.
4.5 Comparison with previous work
In this section, we compare the performance of TapMeIn with previ-
ous works on tap-based authentication, which were primarily pro-
posed for smartphones. TapMeIn is the first tap-based authentication
evaluated for smartwatches.
Several tap-based authentication approaches have been introduced in
the literature. Wobbrock et al. proposed TapSongs, which authenti-
cated a user based on her tapping rhythms input from a binary sensor
[41]. TapSongs only used up–down durations and was based on
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Table 1: Performance comparison between TapMeIn and previous works.
Accuracy FPR - Random Attack FPR-Shoulder Surfing # subjects
TapSongs [41] 83.2% NA 10.7% 10
Marques et. al [22] NA NA 16.67% 30
RhythmLink [21] 92% 3% NA 8
RhyAuth [10] 95.8% 0.7% NA 32
TapMeIn [This work] 98.7 0.98% 2.3% 41
Table 2: Error rates of TapMeIn in two conditions
FPR FRR
Sitting 0.98% 5.3%Walking 9.1%
Table 3: Performance of TapMeIn under attacks
EER
Random Attack 0.013
Shoulder Surfing Attack-I 0.023Attack-II 0.035
Video attack Attack-III 0.041
timing comparison for verification. In [22], Marques et al. proposed
to turn up-down duration sequence into a binary string and used
Hamming distance comparison for user verification. In [21], Lin et
al. proposed to let users pair their different devices by a tap-based
password on both devices. They applied Euclidean distance for
tap-password verification. In [10], Chen et al. proposed RhyAuth, a
user authentication for mobile devices, in which, users can tap or
slide a rhythmic password on the touchscreen to unlock their phone.
RhyAuth also utilized tapping behavior as a second authentication
factor. Table 1 provides a performance comparison between Tap-
MeIn in these works. All figures were taken from corresponding
papers in similar evaluation scenarios (random attack or shoulder
surfing). We can see that TapMeIn outperforms previous work in
terms of accuracy and the resilience against random attack as well as
shoulder surfing. RhyAuth achieved slightly lower FPR of 0.7% in
random attack compared to 0.98% of TapMeIn. However, TapMeIn
achieved higher accuracy (98.7% compared to 95.8% of RhyAuth),
which indicates TapMeIn has lower false rejection rate.
In summary, our work presents several advances and contributions
over previous approaches. First, unlike previous work that only
used time-domain features, we propose a new set of features which
combines both time-domain and frequency-domain features for ver-
ification of tap-based passwords. This new feature set has resulted
in better performances as demonstrated above. We also evaluate
the importance of each feature and provide the insight into their
effectiveness. This was not done in previous approaches. Second,
we present and demonstrate a plausible approach to generate syn-
thesized negative samples for tap-based authentication, which has
important implications. It helps eliminate a popular assumption
made by similar approaches like RhyAuth that imitating samples
from attackers are known and needed for training the classifier. Our
negative sample generation approach helps train a better classifier
for TapMeIn and makes deploying it in real-world applications and
devices much easier as it requires no assumption about user’s choice
of tap-password. Last but not least, we present comprehensive user
studies to evaluate both security and usability of TapMeIn as well as
its comparison with state-of-the-art PIN and Pattern Lock method
(will be presented in the subsequent section). Interesting insights
Figure 4: Frequencies of tap-password’s lengths among 31 users
Figure 5: Regression model built to explain input time based on
tap-password length
from our studies will serve as a baseline and inspire future research.
4.6 Authentication time
Authentication time includes the time it takes a user to enter her
tap-password (input time) and the time it takes to classify the user
input (verification time). Once the classifier is trained, verifying
a user input is fast: verification time is only 24 ms on average in
TapMeIn as observed in our implementation on a Samsung Gear
Live Smartwatch. Thus, the authentication time mostly indicates
input time, which depends on the length of the user’s tap-password
as well as a user’s interpretation of a melody. Figure 4 details the
frequencies of tap-password’s lengths chosen by 31 users. It can
be seen that the majority of the users chose a tap-password with
less than 10 taps. We fit a linear model using the tap-password
length to explain the average input time and present it in Figure 5.
The tap-password length significantly predicted the average input
time (b = 282, t(29) = 7.42, p < 0.0001). The overall model also
predicted the average input time very well (adjusted R2 = 0.655,
F(1,29) = 55.12, p < 0.0001).
In general, it clearly shows that the more taps a tap-password has,
the more time is needed to enter it. From Figure 5, we can also
see that the average input time of tap-passwords with the same
6
Figure 6: Usecases of TapMeIn as rated by the users
length also varies. This is due to different choices of melodies
and different interpretations of the users. The users who chose
melodies with rapid notes were likely to tap faster, resulting in
shorter input time. Overall, the average input time over all users
was 2069 ms (sd = 834 ms). Input time when sitting (mean=2060
ms, sd=856 ms) and walking (mean=2099 ms, sd=805 ms) show
no significant difference. Paired-samples t-test was run on average
input times of all users in two conditions and showed no statistical
significance effect of Condition on input time (t(30) = 0.954, p =
0.348, Cohen’s d = 0.18); thus, we cannot conclude that walking or
sitting would increase or decrease authentication time.
4.7 Users’ perceived usability
At the end of the study, each user answered a survey consisting of
three parts. The first part was 10 questions from the System Usability
Scale (SUS) tool, which is a fast and reliable method for gathering
subjective assessments about the usability of a system [9]. SUS is
widely used in the literature to evaluate system usability [5] [9].
SUS consists of 10 questions, and each can be answered by a Likert-
scale ranging from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree). SUS
score is a value in the range of 0–100, where a higher value indicates
a more usable system. SUS score of a system is calculated by
averaging individual scores of all users. Overall, TapMeIn achieves
a SUS score of 83, which, compared to the standard average score
of 68 [30], suggests that TapMeIn is highly usable.
The second part of our survey consisted of four following Likert-
scale questions designed to gather a user’s perceived security and
speed of TapMeIn. Note that these questions were alternately posi-
tively and negatively phrased to avoid bias in user responses.
• Q11: I think TapMeIn is very secure (1-Strongly Disagree,
5-Strongly Agree)
• Q12: I think guessing the secret rhythmic tap-password is
easy (1-Strongly Disagree, 5-Strongly Agree)
• Q13: I think TapMeIn is very fast (1-Strongly Disagree, 5-
Strongly Agree)
• Q14: I will not use TapMeIn in the future if it becomes a
product (1-Strongly Disagree, 5-Strongly Agree)
Table 4 shows the average ratings of four questions. We can see that,
most users perceived TapMeIn as secure and fast (Q11 and Q13
have high mean values), and they rated that it would not be easy to
guess someone’s tap-password. The users also expressed that they
would like to use TapMeIn in the future. These results confirm that
TapMeIn is usable and is favorable for the users.
Table 4: User’s ratings of four questions in the second part of the
survey
mean sd
Q11-Security rating 4.5 0.74
Q12-Guessability rating 1.56 0.71
Q13-Speed rating 4.03 0.73
Q14-Unlikelihood of future usage 1.59 0.87
In the third part of the survey, we asked the users about use cases
of TapMeIn. The question was “In which situation you would use
TapMeIn to unlock your watch, consider that you have PIN, Pattern
Lock, and TapMeIn as available options," with following choices
and a text box for another suggestion.
• S1: A quiet place like office or classroom
• S2: A public place like a busy subway or a party
• S3: At home with family or friends
• S4: Jogging or biking
• S5: You feel that somebody may look at your watch when
you are authenticating
The results are depicted in Figure 6. Interestingly, TapMeIn was
chosen by most users in a situation where shoulder surfing threat
is stronger (S2 and S5). This was also confirmed by our informal
interview with users after the study. The users also suggested that
TapMeIn can be deployed as a secure method alongside PIN or
Pattern Lock, which can be invoked when they need a higher security
level based on their surrounding.
5. COMPARISON TO PIN AND PATTERN
LOCK AUTHENTICATION
In this section, a second study is presented with the goal to compare
TapMeIn with two de-facto methods currently available on smart-
watches, PIN and Pattern Lock, in terms of error rate, security and
authentication time. In the PIN and Pattern Lock methods, error rate
is defined as the ratio of the number of user mistakes divided by the
total number of user trials. In TapMeIn, the error rate is the FRR
which includes user mistake as well as classifier errors.
5.1 Study Design
This study was conducted using a repeated measures factorial design.
The independent variables were Method and Condition. Method has
three levels: PIN, Pattern Lock and TapMeIn. Condition has two
levels: Sitting and Walking. The dependent variables were error rate
and authentication time. This study was designed and carried out
in the same procedure and apparatus as in Study-I for fairness of
comparison.
5.2 Procedure
We implemented PIN and Pattern Lock authentication on the same
Samsung Gear Live Smartwatch which allowed us to capture the
authentication time of each login session from each method. Partici-
pants, which were 31 users from Study-I, went through the similar
procedure as in Study-I. Specifically, each user was asked to choose
a 4-digit PIN for the PIN method and a pattern with length >= 4
for the Pattern Lock method. The users were allowed to practice
unlocking with the two methods until they felt comfortable with
both methods and were able to successfully unlock the watch at
least five times using each method in each condition.
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Figure 7: Average error rate of three methods in two conditions
Figure 8: Average authentication time of three methods in two
conditions
In the authentication phase, each user was asked to unlock the
watch using each method ten times while sitting and ten times
while walking. Counterbalancing was conducted by a Latin square
design. For security evaluation, an experimenter recorded a video of
a successful authentication session of each user for each method in
sitting condition. This study lasted about half an hour for each user.
10 attackers from Study-I also participated as attackers in this study
and went through the same process to simulate the three attacks
described earlier. The difference is an attacker stopped whenever
they got the correct PIN or pattern of the user.
5.3 Results
For each method (PIN and Pattern Lock), there were 31 (users) ×
10 (unlocks per condition) = 310 unlocks in sitting condition and
310 unlocks in walking condition. Error rate and authentication
time in these two conditions of the three methods are detailed in
Figure 7 and Figure 8. Note that figures for TapMeIn were taken
from Study-I. With two-way repeated measures ANOVA, we found
significant effect of Condition (Sitting/Walking) on the error rate
(F(1,30)= 12.70, p= 0.001, partial η2 = 0.297), but no significant
main effect of Method (PIN/Pattern Lock/TapMeIn) on error rate
(F(1.65,49.5) = 0.596, p = 0.524, partial η2 = 0.019).
Running two-way repeated measures ANOVA on average authen-
tication times in two conditions in three methods, we found signif-
icant effects of Method on authentication time (F(2,60) = 28.66,
p < 0.001, partial η2 = 0.49), but no significant effect of Condi-
tion on authentication time (F(1,30) = 0.064, p = 0.80, partial
η2 = 0.002). Pairwise post hoc tests using Bonferroni correction
showed significant difference in authentication time between Tap-
MeIn (mean=2079, sd=148) and Pattern Lock (mean=1150, sd=80)
(p < 0.001), but no significant difference between TapMeIn and
PIN (mean=2180, sd=85) (p > 0.05). There was also significant
difference in authentication time between Pattern Lock (mean=1150,
sd=80) and PIN (mean=2197, sd=87) (p < 0.001). These results
suggest that, in terms of authentication time, TapMeIn is slower than
Pattern Lock.
In terms of shoulder surfing resilience, attackers achieved success
rates of 93.75% and 96.88% on PIN and Pattern Lock method,
respectively, in Attack-I and 100% in Attack-II for both methods.
None of them needed to do video attack (Attack-III) as they all
succeeded after Attack-II. Compared to attackers’ success rate of
2.3% (Attack-I) and 3.5% (Attack-II) in TapMeIn, we can see that
TapMeIn is far more resilient against shoulder surfing than PIN and
Pattern Lock.
6. DISCUSSION
Although results presented in our evaluation are encouraging, fur-
ther investigation is needed as the data set is somewhat limited.
Nevertheless, as a proof-of-concept, we have shown that TapMeIn
is potential for smartwatch authentication. Results can be seen as
comparable to the state-of-the-art in the literature. We plan to con-
duct a real-world study to collect a data set which is not only larger
but more realistic.
Another limitation of the work is that we did not have enough data
to analyze the effect of other conditions on the performance of
TapMeIn, e.g., age or gender. For example, older users may have
lower motor precision compared to young users, which may affect
their recall of tap-passwords. This is a popular issue in touch-based
research. We leave this topic for future work.
In the informal interview with users and attackers, we received some
interesting feedback. Most users felt tapping is a natural task, just
as how they tap along when listening to music, and they enjoyed
TapMeIn better. For the attackers, they perceived TapMeIn was the
hardest to attack among the three methods. Their strategy for video
attack was to tap along when watching the video. Still, they found
it difficult to replicate the victim’s tap-password, especially when
taking tap pressure and finger size into consideration. Interestingly,
one attacker correctly recognized that a user tapped “SOS” in Morse
code as her password. Despite that, FPR of this user was 0%.
Recently, acoustic side channel attacks on tap-based authentication
have been introduced, which include human attack as well as au-
tomated attack based on signal processing [3]. The idea was to
extract a tap-password from tapping-sounds. The automated attack
achieved an average accuracy of 85%. However, these attacks may
only achieve high success in systems that use only durations to
represent a tap-password, like those in [41, 22, 21]. We argue that
these attacks will not achieve much success in systems that utilize
behavioral and physiological characteristics as a second authenti-
cation factor, like TapMeIn. As we have shown in our video attack
evaluation, the attacker’s success rate was only 4.1%.
Thermal attacks [1], which use thermal camera to capture heat
traces resulting from authentication, can be used to reconstruct
PIN/patterns with high success rate (72% to 100% when performed
within the first 30 seconds after authentication). We argue that
TapMeIn is not vulnerable to this attack. First, we observe that users
tend to tap at a single spot on the screen which makes it really hard
for thermal attack to infer how many taps are there in the password.
Second, even knowing the number of taps, the attacker still needs
to imitate tapping behavior of the user, which has been shown to be
very difficult in our security evaluation (only 2.3% FPR).
Regarding the comparative study between TapMeIn and PIN and
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Pattern Lock, we found some interesting insights. First, in terms of
error rate, PIN authentication on smartwatches produced an error
rate that was more than twice as high as that of smartphones (average:
8.1% compared to 3.1% [15]). However, the error rate of Pattern
Lock on smartwatches was better (average: 9.35% compared to
12.1% on smartphones [15]). This indicates fat-finger may be a
problem for PIN method on smartwatches. Moreover, the error rate
when entering patterns is four times as high as that when entering
PINs on smartphones. Surprisingly, the results in our study suggest
that on smartwatches, error rates are very similar between PIN and
Pattern Lock. In terms of input time, PIN (average: 2180 ms) and
Pattern Lock (1150 ms) on smartwatches were slower than PIN
(average: 1963 ms) and Pattern (average: 910 ms) on smartphones
[15]. Note that our study was conducted in a lab whereas Harbach
et al. conducted a field one. Nevertheless, these are very surprising
usability results which deserve further investigation. We leave this
for a longitudinal field study in future work.
7. RELATED WORK
7.1 Smartwatches and Wearables Authentica-
tion
In recent years, authentication for smartwatches and wearables have
been attracting attention from researchers. Bianchi et al. surveyed
recent advances in the wearables authentication research and pre-
dicted that this topic will develop rapidly in the next decade [6].
Smartwatches and wearables possess limited input channels, i.e.,
small screen makes entering passwords laborious or difficult. How-
ever, wearables often have rich sensing capabilities. Moreover, with
the advantage of being adorned by a user, wearables can be used to
collect rich biometric information for explicit and implicit authen-
tication. This is why a significant body of wearable authentication
work has concentrated on building a behavioral model using sensor
data [19, 20, 33, 2, 24].
For example, Johnston et. al proposed to build a gait biometric
model for a user using data recorded by accelerometers and gy-
roscopes on smartwatch [19]. They achieved 1.4% EER with a
10-second window of sensor data for each authentication session.
Similarly, Kumar et. al built a behavioral biometric of user’s arm
movement using accelerometers and gyroscopes sensor data on a
smartwatch while a user was walking [20]. They evaluated multiple
classifiers for authentication of user on a smartwatch. They re-
ported best FPR of 2.2% and FRR of 4.2% with k-Nearest Neighbor
classifier using a fusion feature set of both sensors.
These kind of approaches have a drawback as they require a user to
walk, and for a period of time (i.e., 10 seconds) before an authen-
tication decision can be made. This renders them only suitable for
implicit authentication. Nassi et. al proposed handwritten signature
based user verification for wearables. The user wears a smartwatch
or a wearable device while signing her signature on a paper. Sensors
data captured from the signing process is used to authenticate the
user. They reported an EER of 5%. Our work is potentially the
first touchscreen based authentication approach for smartwatches.
We have shown that the fat-finger problem can be mitigated and
comparable performance to these implicit methods can be achieved.
7.2 Tap-based Authentication
Several tap-based authentication approaches have been introduced in
the literature. As presented in the performance comparison section,
most of them only used tap durations as features for authentication,
i.e., TapSongs by Wobbrock et al. [41], RhythmLink [21] or pro-
posed approach by Marques et. al [22]. Such features could not
fully capture user’s behavioral characteristics such as tap pressure
and user’s physiological characteristics like finger tip size. This
was shown in either low accuracy or high false positive and false
negative rates reported in these works. RhyAuth, proposed by Chen
et al. [10], is a rhythmic-based user authentication for mobile de-
vices, which utilized behavioral and physiological features in user’s
tap as a second authentication factor. There are key differences
between RhyAuth and TapMeIn. First, RhyAuth assumed that nega-
tive samples are preloaded or downloaded from a server at training
time, which, as discussed in Section 2 (System Design), does not
work because totally random negative samples bias user’s classifier,
resulting in a poor classification performance when classifying real
imitating samples. Second, the classifier of a user was trained and
tested with samples from other users in their evaluation while Tap-
MeIn can be trained with only user’s enrollment and synthesized
samples, and tested with her login and imitating samples from at-
tackers, which were “unseen” by the classifier. Thus, our results
potentially reflect true performance in a real-world scenario. In
addition, TapMeIn is the first tap-based authentication evaluated for
smartwatches.
Beside the application for authentication, tap and rhythmic patterns
have also been proposed for improving user input and interaction
with smartwatches. Ghomi et. al [13] introduced Rhythmic Inter-
action. It allowed users to build a vocabulary of rhythmic patterns,
which were map to specific commands to form new input modality
for small screen devices like smartwatches. Similarly, Oakley et.
al [26] proposed beat gestures to extend input methods on smart-
watches. Our work is different from these approaches in the sense
that not only TapMeIn needs to recognize tap pattern, it also needs
to verify whether the pattern belongs to a specific user. This, in a
way, is a more difficult task.
8. CONCLUSION
This paper introduces TapMeIn, a fast, accurate and secure two-
factor authentication for smartwatches that allows users to tap a
memorable melody anywhere on the screen to authenticate. Exper-
imental results showed that TapMeIn provides protection against
shoulder surfing and video attacks, while maintaining short authen-
tication time and low error rate. Comprehensive experiments were
conducted to compare it with the de-facto PIN and Pattern Lock on
smartwatches. Lastly, a user study rated TapMeIn as highly usable
and was favored for authentication in situations where a higher level
of security is needed.
For future work, we plan to offer TapMeIn as a real app on the app
store to collect more data. Additionally, we would like to introduce
TapMeIn to people with visual impairments and evaluate its perfor-
mance. We also want to study the change in tapping behavior of
users over time and to explore classifier adapting/updating strategies
for TapMeIn, making it more effective in a large scale deployment.
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